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DEFINING AGGRESSION: AN OPPORTUNITY 
TO CURTAIL THE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
OF NON-STATE ACTORS 
INTRODUCTION 
n 1999, the United Nations (“U.N.”) passed resolution 1267, which 
created the “Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee” tasked 
with monitoring sanctions placed against the Taliban.1 Two years after 
the sanctions were put into place, terrorists belonging to and associated 
with Al-Qaida hijacked four United States airplanes in furtherance of a 
terrorist attack that would forever be remembered as “9/11.” 2  Since 
2001, the U.N. has passed seven additional resolutions modifying the 
sanctions regime to include individuals and entities associated with 
Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaida, and the Taliban.3 Yet, between September 
2001 and March 2004, Al-Qaida was accredited for seven additional ter-
rorist attacks.4 
A possible reason why U.N. sanctions have had a limited effect on Al-
Qaida is because Al-Qaida is a non-state actor (“NSA”). The term NSA 
has a variety of different meanings; spanning from rebels and terrorists to 
businessman and religious groups.5 The intuitive definition of a NSA is 
quite simple: any person or group that is not a state.6 However, this Note 
is particularly interested in the category of NSAs defined as “armed 
                                                                                                                                  
 1. Sanctions were initially levied against Taliban for their support of Al-Qaeda and 
Osama bin Laden. Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 
(1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities, 
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 
18, 2011) [hereinafter Security Council Committee Concerning Al-Qaida and Taliban]; 
S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
 2. Hijacked airliners were flown into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, claiming 
about 3,000 lives. An additional plane was believed to be heading towards the White 
House, but crashed outside of Pittsburgh. In Depth: September 11 What Happened?, 
CBC NEWS ONLINE (Sept. 11, 2007), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/sep11/index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
 3. Resolutions 1390(2002), 1455(2003), 1526(2004), 1617(2005), 1735(2006), and 
1822(2008) were all passed so that sanctions would apply to designated individuals and 
groups associated with Osama bin Laden and/or the Taliban, irrelevant of their location. 
Security Council Committee Concerning Al-Qaida and Taliban, supra note 1. 
 4. See Mary Glendinning, Timeline: Al-Qaida Attacks on Western Targets, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (July 7, 2005), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4733944 (last visited Jan. 15, 
2011). 
 5. See Andrew Clapham, Non-State Actors, in POST CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING: A 
LEXICON 200, 200 (Vincent Chetail ed., 2009). 
 6. See id.  
I 
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groups that operate beyond state control.”7 This type of NSA includes, 
but is not limited to rebels, local militants, vigilantes, warlords, and civil 
defense forces.8 Al-Qaida falls into this category of armed groups be-
cause they are an international terrorist organization that does not depend 
on the support of a political state.9 Yet, Al-Qaida is just one example; the 
International Institute of Strategic Studies’ armed conflict database cur-
rently lists eighty-four different NSA groups in the Middle East and 
North Africa alone.10 
The problem that NSAs present to the international community is ex-
emplified by Al-Qaeda: despite a slew of U.N. sanctions, Al-Qaida has 
persisted in terrorist activity. International humanitarian and human 
rights laws have been similarly ineffective with policing the criminal 
activities of NSAs.11 This is troubling because the international climate 
has grown less state-centered, with increasing influence from NSAs.12 As 
the threat presented by NSAs expands,13 it is imperative that the interna-
tional community recognize the changing dynamic of conflicts, internal 
and international, and adapt its laws accordingly. 
One such opportunity to shape the laws of armed conflicts arose in 
2010, when the Assembly of State Parties14 (“ASP”) to the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”) met to review the Rome Statute and define the 
                                                                                                                                  
 7. Caroline Holmqvist, Engaging Armed Non-State Actors in Post-Conflict Settings, 
in SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING 45, 45 (Alan Bryden & 
Heiner Hanggi eds., 2005) (discussing the importance of including NSAs in peace talks 
once a conflict has concluded). 
 8. Id.   
 9. Laura Hayes et al., Al-Qaeda: Osama bin Laden’s Network of Terror, 
INFOPLEASE.COM, http://www.infoplease.com/spot/al-qaeda-terrorism.html (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2011) (explaining the leadership and structure of Al-Qaida, and how Al-Qaida is 
different than “more traditional terrorist organizations”). 
 10. See Armed Conflict Database, THE INT’L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, 
http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictList.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 
2011). 
 11. See Marco Sassòli, Possible Legal Mechanisms to Improve Compliance by 
Armed Groups with International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights 
Law 2 (2003) (Armed Groups Conf., Conference Paper), available at 
http://www.genevacall.org/resources/other-documents-studies/f-other-documents-
studies/2001-2010/2003-13nov-sassoli.pdf. 
 12. Id. at 2. 
 13. See id. 
 14. The ASP to the ICC refers to those countries that have ratified the Rome Statute, 
and make up the court’s governing body. In the News: What Should You Know About 
2010 ICC Review Conference?, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, 
http://www.globalsolutions.org/issues/what_should_you_know_about_2010_icc_review_
conference (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) [hereinafter In the News]. 
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“crime of aggression.”15 Although not the formal definition, aggression 
refers to the legality of resorting to force.16 This conference was signifi-
cant, because how the crime is defined will determine whether NSAs, 
like Al-Qaida, can be prosecuted for attacks like 9/11. As it stands, Al-
Qaida would have escaped prosecution. The adopted definition focuses 
entirely on state action, and reads in pertinent part: 
[T]he planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a 
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or 
military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its charac-
ter, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations.17 
Though the amendment was passed in 2010, the ICC may only exer-
cise jurisdiction over this crime subject to another vote to be held after 
January 1, 2017.18 Going forward with such a definition would be a mis-
take. As the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change 
stated, “the norms governing the use of force by non-state actors have 
not kept pace with those pertaining to states.”19 With the laws of war 
continually growing outdated, adding such a provision to the Rome Sta-
tute is like placing a fresh brick atop a crumbling foundation. 
Part I of this Note provides a background of the international laws go-
verning conflicts, particularly those relating to NSAs. Part II criticizes 
the current international framework for conflict resolution. Specifically, 
Part II discusses why international law is too outdated to properly handle 
modern conflicts and how developments in international criminal law 
make it the best avenue for enforcing laws against NSAs. Part III focuses 
                                                                                                                                  
 15. Review Conference of the Rome Statute, COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=review (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Review Con-
ference of the Rome Statute].   
 16. Frédéric Mégret, International Criminal Law 13 (Dec. 29, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1321253&download=yes (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 17. Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art 8(2), 
June 11, 2010, Depository Notification C.N.651.2010.Treaties-8 [hereinafter Rome Sta-
tute Amendments]. 
 18. Id. art 15(2). 
 19. In a speech delivered before the General Assembly in September 2003, the Secre-
tary-General of the U.N. announced that the member states needed to come to an agree-
ment on the nature of the threats to collective security. With this goal in mind, the Secre-
tary-General convened a panel including eminent persons to provide a comprehensive 
view on this subject, as well as advice on how to move forward. The results of this panel 
were presented to the General Assembly on December 2, 2004. The Secretary-General, 
Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, ¶ 159, U.N. Doc. 
A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter High-Level Panel Report]. 
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on the Rome Statute and particularly the 2010 review. Given that this 
review amended the Rome Statute to define the crime of aggression, this 
Note discusses the implications and shortcomings of this amendment. 
Lastly, Part IV argues that by passing a state-focused definition of ag-
gression, the international community missed a critical opportunity to 
reign in the illegal activities of NSAs. 
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
According to its preamble, the goal of the U.N. is to promote global 
peace, “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,” establish conditions 
under which justice can flourish, and “promote social progress and better 
standards of life.”20 It logically follows that the U.N. Charter charges the 
Security Council with the goal of restoring and maintaining global peace 
and security, 21  while not aggravating the situation. 22  So although the 
U.N. is an assembly of nations, to meet their responsibilities the U.N. 
must have certain tactics at its disposal for dealing with the threats pre-
sented by NSAs. In this vein, in 2006 the U.N. published a set of guide-
lines entitled “Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups.”23 The 
manual lists international humanitarian law, international human rights 
law, and international criminal law as the three principle branches that 
frame the discussion for humanitarian negotiations with NSAs.24 While 
criminal and humanitarian laws are specific to conflicts, international 
human rights law provides certain universal rights guaranteed to all 
people.25 The guidelines of such negotiations are of special interest to 
this discussion since international humanitarian law is often used syn-
onymously to describe the laws of war or proscribe appropriate conduct 
                                                                                                                                  
 20. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 21. Id. art. 39. 
 22. Article 40 of the U.N. Charter states: 
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, 
before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided 
for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provi-
sional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures 
shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties con-
cerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with 
such provisional measures. 
Id. art. 40. 
 23. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], Humanita-
rian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners (Jan. 2006) (by Gerald 
McHugh & Manuel Bessler) [hereinafter Humanitarian Negotiations Manual]. 
 24. Id. at 30. 
 25. Id. at 33. 
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during wartime.26 Thus, adherence to international humanitarian law is 
closely related to conflict resolution. 
To avoid confusion, it is worth noting the difference between the terms 
“humanitarian principles” and “international humanitarian law.” In gen-
eral, humanitarian principles refer to alleviating human suffering whe-
rever it may be found.27 This term comes from, and is the focus of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross.28 On the other hand, interna-
tional humanitarian law is a set of rules which seeks to “limit the effects 
of armed conflicts.”29 To this extent, it looks to protect those that were 
not involved in, or are no longer involved in armed conflicts, and re-
stricts the methods and tactics used to carry out a war.30 This area of law 
is comprised of a number of treaties, as well as custom.31 At its core, 
those treaties are the Geneva Convention of 1949, which binds nearly 
every state in the world,32 and the additional protocols of 1977.33 Of 
these treaties, the ones specific to NSAs are Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions, and Protocol Additional II.34 Additionally, custo-
mary international humanitarian law is a set of rules and norms that has 
arisen out of regular practice, creating a general belief that such practice 
should be adhered to as a matter of law.35 
It is important to remember that treaty-based international humanita-
rian law was enacted by states. Thus, in theory, NSAs are expected to 
follow and adhere to a set of rules and guidelines that they had no part in 
creating.36 To complicate matters further, NSAs are typically involved in 
                                                                                                                                  
 26. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Advisory Serv. on Int’l Humanitarian Law, 
What is International Humanitarian Law? (July 31, 2004), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf (defining international humani-
tarian law) [hereinafter ICRC, International Humanitarian Law]. 
 27. See Jean Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary, 
ICRC (1979) (discussing the purpose of the Red Cross, a non-governmental organization 
that was founded to “bring[] assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the 
battlefield”). 
 28. Id. 
 29. ICRC, International Humanitarian Law, supra note 26. 
 30. Some agreements specify the protection of children, or forbid the use of specific 
weapons and tactics. Id. 
 31. Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 30.  
 32. ICRC, International Humanitarian Law, supra note 26.  
 33. Other treaties of international humanitarian law include the Hague Conventions of 
1907.  Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 30. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 32 (pointing out that even if a state is not a signatory to a given treaty, it is 
still expected to adhere to the principle of not targeting buildings that are essential to 
civilian survival, such as water treatment plants). 
 36. See Sassòli, supra note 11, at 6. 
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fighting against the state that enacted the law that is supposed to bind 
them and by definition, are illegal in said state.37 It logically follows that 
where the law was created with the problems and goals of only one party 
in mind, these laws will be less effective.38 Given the vast number of 
NSAs around the world, and the fact that by their nature, it is impossible 
to predict which NSAs will exist in the future, lack of participation by 
NSAs in international treaties is unlikely to change. Furthermore, it is 
improbable that there will be any future conferences regarding this area 
of law, as the codification of international humanitarian laws has largely 
been completed.39 
Customary international humanitarian law is considered binding on 
both sides of a conflict, irrelevant of ratification, and enjoys a higher de-
gree of legitimacy.40 Dubbed the “Marten’s Clause,” one of the most im-
portant rules of customary international humanitarian law comes from 
the preamble of Additional Protocol II. 41 It declares that “in cases not 
covered by the law in force, the human person remains under the protec-
tion of the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public con-
science.” 42  So since customary international humanitarian law exists 
without formalized treaties, a nation’s or individuals’ approval of the law 
is theoretically immaterial to its application. 
                                                                                                                                  
 37. Id. at 7. 
 38. See id. at 6 (discussing that at least psychologically, people might have an easier 
time accepting a set of laws if they were involved or represented in the creation of the 
laws). 
 39. The Hague Conventions were in 1907, the Geneva Conventions were in 1949, and 
the Additional Protocols were enacted in 1977. Thus, there has not been a new treaty of 
international humanitarian law in forty-two years. See generally Humanitarian Negotia-
tions Manual, supra note 23, at 30; see also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Binding Armed Op-
position Groups Through Humanitarian Treaty Law and Customary Law, 27 COLLEGIUM 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 123, 128 (2003) [hereinafter Henckaerts, Binding Armed Opposition 
Groups] (discussing how involving NSAs in future treaties is not a likely remedy to the 
problem of NSAs being unrepresented in the treaties that currently govern international 
humanitarian law). 
 40. Henckaerts, Binding Armed Opposition Groups, supra note 39, at 128; see also 
Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contri-
bution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 857 
INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 175, 198–212 (2005) [hereinafter Henckaerts, Humanita-
rian Law] (providing a description of the 161 rules recognized as binding customary 
international humanitarian law). 
 41. Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 32. 
 42. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) pmbl, 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
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Much like international humanitarian law, international human rights 
law is composed mostly of treaties, declarations, and covenants, which 
are signed and ratified by states.43 The goal of these treaties and cove-
nants is to define the “universal, interdependent and indivisible entitle-
ments of individuals.” 44  Unlike international humanitarian law, these 
laws are applicable during both peace and wartime, and can never be 
suspended.45 Another difference is that international human rights laws 
only impose responsibility on the state to its citizens,46 and as such, only 
the state is capable of violating human rights laws.47 An opposing view is 
that although NSAs cannot be a party to the existing treaties, its members 
are expected to adhere to them and will be prosecuted accordingly for 
violations.48 Thus, much like international humanitarian law, internation-
al human rights law excludes NSAs from the process, but expects them 
to abide by the results. 
Of the three, international criminal law provides the most effective 
foundation for holding NSAs accountable for their international crimes.49 
This branch of law imposes criminal sanctions in an effort to protect a 
certain international order, or basic core values that pierce state bor-
ders.50 Although international criminal law initially took aim at states 
housing international criminals, over time the focus has shifted to indi-
vidual criminal responsibility.51 Despite this focus on individual respon-
                                                                                                                                  
 43. These, among others, include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
and the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (1966). Humanitarian Ne-
gotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 33. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Henckaerts, Humanitarian Law, supra note 40, at 196. 
 46. See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict 
Situations, 863 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 491, 511 (2006) (presenting the arguments 
for why human rights laws do not actually bind NSAs). 
 47. See The High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, ¶ 18, 
delivered to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/64 (Dec. 27, 
2002) [hereinafter The Right to a Remedy] (discussing the right to a remedy for persons 
victimized by human rights violations, and finding such remedies are only available when 
the perpetrator is a state actor). 
 48. See Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 33 (acknowledging that 
it is the state’s responsibility to enforce international human rights law, but NSAs can be 
prosecuted for their violation under applicable national law, or international criminal 
law). 
 49. “International crimes,” does not necessarily have the same connotation as “inter-
national criminal law.” As used here, it simply refers to any violation of international 
law. 
 50. Mégret, supra note 16, at 10–11. 
 51. Id. at 4; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(2), July 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (providing in pertinent part that 
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sibility, international criminal law still shares the same structure as other 
fields of international law; individuals can only be prosecuted for violat-
ing a law to which their state was a member.52 International criminal law 
is derived from the general principles of international law, agreements by 
states on particular activities, and commonly recognized principles of 
national law.53 Although treaty-based international criminal law is found 
in several agreements,54 this Note focuses on the Rome Statute. 
The Rome Statute holds special importance because it is considered the 
most comprehensive substantive piece of international criminal law and, 
in effect, codifies all of the “core crimes.”55 Furthermore, it is the in-
strument which created the ICC, the first permanent, international 
court.56 The ICC was created to promote the rule of law and was given 
“the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious 
crimes of international concern.”57 Moreover, the Rome Statute provides 
the ICC with a list of sources of law to apply.58 This is unique to the ICC 
because founding documents for other international criminal laws were 
focused on national state law.59 On the other hand, Article 21 of the 
Rome Statute declares itself first among sources of law for the court to 
apply.60 This bears special importance to NSAs because the Rome Sta-
tute establishes jurisdiction over individual61 and specifically addresses 
non-international conflicts.62 Thus, given its focus on individuals, and 
                                                                                                                                  
“a person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually 
responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute”). 
 52. Mégret, supra note 16, at 5. 
 53. Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 34. 
 54. Examples include: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), 
The U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), and The Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children 
(2000). Id. 
 55. Mégret, supra note 16, at 7. 
 56. Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 35.   
 57. It further provides that the court will assume a complementary role to national 
criminal courts, and that the jurisdiction and functioning of the court is to be governed by 
the statute. Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 1. 
 58. Id. art. 21. 
 59. See Mégret, supra note 16, at 6. 
 60. Only after applying the Rome Statute, “Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence,” may the ICC look to pertinent treaties and rules from international 
law. Last amongst applicable law for the ICC are general principles that the court derives 
from national laws of legal systems around the world, particularly the states that might 
normally exercise jurisdiction. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 21. 
 61. Id. art 1. 
 62. Article 8(2)(c) provides in sum and substance: 
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jurisdiction over NSAs, the ICC and amendments to the Rome Statute 
bear a special importance to the future of conflict resolution in the con-
text of NSAs. 
Although the laws are in place, they must still be enforced. Historical-
ly, international criminal law has been uniquely vulnerable to claims cri-
ticizing it for this very failure. 63 One reason for this problem is that 
strong international criminal law enforcement is typically linked to the 
strength of the organization behind it.64 In this vein, the ICC has bene-
fited substantially from backing by a coalition of “like minded” States.65 
Although the U.S. has been critical of the ICC, it has received support 
from the European Union as well as a number of Latin American and 
African States.66 Moreover, the U.N. even acknowledged that “[i]n the 
area of legal mechanisms, there have been few more important recent 
developments than the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal 
Court.”67 Further U.N. support for the ICC is found in the Relationship 
Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Na-
tions, adopted in 2004.68 The preamble of this agreement recognizes the 
important role played by the ICC, and states the U.N.’s desire to estab-
lish a “mutually beneficial relationship.”69 
Another reason that international criminal law stands out amongst oth-
er branches of international law is International Military Tribunals 
                                                                                                                                  
In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious viola-
tions of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
namely . . . 
Id. art. 8(2)(c). 
Article 8(2)(f) further provides: 
. . . It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when 
there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and orga-
nized groups or between such groups. 
Id. art. 8(2)(f). 
 63. Mégret, supra note 16, at 22. 
 64. For instance, one reason that the prohibition on slave traffic in the 19th century 
was successful is that Britain threw its weight behind the prohibition, and threatened to 
use British forces to patrol the Atlantic to enforce the ban. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, ¶ 90. 
 68. Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and 
the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/58/874/Annex (Aug. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Negotiated 
Relationship Agreement] (highlighting the ways in which the U.N. and the ICC are al-
ready connected, while providing future goals and areas of cooperation). 
 69. Id. pmbl. 
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(“IMTs”). An IMT is typically created by the same treaty that put into 
force a given set of laws.70 Historically, these tribunals were created ad 
hoc to adjudicate a specific situation and were limited either in territory, 
time, or personally.71 For example, the Nuremberg IMT was created by 
the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal. 72  It was 
created in the wake of World War II with the specific purpose of trying 
crimes stemming from that war.73 Although the Rome Statute’s creation 
of the ICC is technically considered an IMT in the same regard as tribun-
als before it, it stands out as the only one established permanently and 
given universal jurisdiction.74 
II. THE OUTDATED INTERNATIONAL MODEL 
One of the chief issues that the international community has with po-
licing NSAs is repercussions. Punishment is important, because as dis-
cussed in this Section, NSAs may not recognize the laws as applicable to 
them.75 To adequately appreciate the shortcomings of the global system 
and the international laws governing war, the discussion should begin 
with the founding of the U.N. and its Charter. The preamble immediately 
evidences why the U.N. has problems dealing with NSAs: although the 
purpose of the U.N. is promoting global peace, the Charter was enacted 
by an assembly of governments.76 Furthermore, the U.N. has since ad-
                                                                                                                                  
 70. Mégret, supra note 16, at 26.   
 71. Id. 
 72. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annex to the Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (“London 
Agreement”), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg 
IMT]. 
 73. Id. art. 6. 
 74. Mégret, supra note 16, at 27; see also Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 1 (stating 
that the court is “hereby established. It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the 
power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international 
concern . . .”). 
 75. See Clapham, supra note 46, at 511 (discussing the various arguments for why 
NSAs are bound by international law, and the responses those arguments will likely re-
ceive from the NSAs); see also Sassòli, supra note 11, at 3–6 (discussing how NSAs 
might respond to various arguments about being bound by international humanitarian or 
human rights laws). 
 76. The preamble of the U.N. Charter reads in pertinent part: 
To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our 
lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and 
To reaffirm faith in fundamental rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, 
and 
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mitted that the primary goal of its creation was state security.77 Thus, 
although the nations that gathered for the first assembly of the U.N. 
agreed to the Charter,78 the various NSAs the Charter hopes to govern 
did not. So the U.N., acting as peace keeper for the globe, is challenged 
to monitor the actions of a variety of groups who never authorized it to 
exercise power over them. 
The current architecture of international law is poorly equipped to pre-
vent or resolve conflicts involving NSAs. The problem with the laws 
governing conflict resolution is that although the international reality 
grows more focused on NSAs, international laws remain focused on state 
responsibilities.79 Moreover, even where the rules apparently apply to the 
NSA, there is seldom an actual international forum for the aggrieved par-
ty to seek relief and invoke the NSA’s responsibility.80 This is largely 
because the laws of war predate the recent explosion of NSAs onto the 
global stage. As neither international humanitarian nor international 
criminal law has seen development since 1998, 81  meaningful change 
does not happen often. 
Even politicians that applaud the U.N.’s successes82 stress that if the 
U.N. is to meet the challenges of providing collective security83 in the 
                                                                                                                                  
To establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations aris-
ing from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and 
To promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. 
U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 77. Anand Panyarachun, Chairman of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, 
and Change, highlighted this problem in his report which was presented by the Secretary-
General of the U.N. to the General Assembly. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, 
synopsis. 
 78. U.N. Charter, pmbl. 
 79. Sassòli, supra note 11, at 1–2 (arguing that not only are most of the international 
rules state-centered, but the implementation mechanisms are even more so). 
 80. This is true regardless of whether the aggrieved party is an individual, an injured 
State, an international organization, or a third party State. See id. at 2. 
 81. International humanitarian law, governed by the Geneva Conventions, was last 
altered in 1977 with the addition of Protocol II. International criminal law is largely go-
verned by the Rome Statute which was passed in 1998, and entered into force in 2002. 
Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 30, 35. 
 82. Anand Panyarachun, the former Prime Minister of Thailand and the Chairman of 
the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, starts his report to the Security 
Council by applauding the U.N. for past successes, and insisting it has been more suc-
cessful than people give it credit for. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, transmittal 
letter. 
 83. At its founding, the U.N. thought of collective security as a collective response by 
its members should the security of a state be put in jeopardy. High-Level Panel Report, 
supra note 19, synopsis. 
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21st century, major changes are needed.84 This is partially because the 
proliferation of NSAs has led observers to believe the importance of the 
state is diminishing.85 For a demonstration of this fact, one only has to 
glance at a breakdown of the conflicts that have plagued the world be-
tween 1946 and 2002. In 1946 there were two inter-state wars as opposed 
to ten ongoing civil wars,86 While the number of inter-state wars has 
never eclipsed six in a given year, the number of civil wars rose to fifty-
two in 1992, before settling down to thirty in 2002.87 Considering that 
the number of civil wars today is much higher than it was when the U.N. 
was founded, it would be foolish to keep shaping international law in its 
1945 image. 
To understand why NSAs present such a challenge to the U.N., it is 
important to consider the effectiveness of the laws discussed above. Part 
A of this Section examines the U.N.’s use of sanctions and discusses why 
they are an ineffective means of attaining compliance from NSAs. Next, 
Part B discusses how the failures of international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law stem from their being inapplicable. Final-
ly, Part C argues that of the three, international criminal law provides the 
best hope for policing the criminal activities of NSAs. 
A. To Sanction, or Not to Sanction? 
No proper discussion of the penalties associated with disregarding in-
ternational law would be complete without an overview of U.N. based 
sanctions. Following the Cold War, “peacemaking, peacekeeping and 
post-conflict peacebuilding in civil wars [became] the operational face of 
the United Nations in international peace and security.”88 During this 
same time period, the U.N. has turned to the use of sanctions with in-
creasing frequency.89 Its power to implement sanctions stems from Chap-
ter VII of the U.N. Charter, which governs actions in response to a 
                                                                                                                                  
 84. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, transmittal letter. 
 85. See generally Muhittin Ataman, The Impact of Non-State Actors on World Poli-
tics: A Challenge to Nation-States, ALTERNATIVES: TURKISH J. OF INT’L RELATIONS, vol. 
2, no. 1, 2003, available at 
http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number1/ataman2.htm. 
 86. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, fig.I.   
 87. See id. fig.I. 
 88. Id. ¶ 84. 
 89. For example, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iraq to force it out of Ku-
wait, to compel Serbia to stop aiding the Bosnian rebels, and to topple the Haitian mili-
tary. See generally Renee B. Agress et al., The Effects of Economic Sanctions on Internal 
Conflict: The Capacity and Preferences of Domestic Groups in Target States (paper pre-
sented at the annual meeting of Southern Political Science Association, Jan. 6, 2005); see 
also Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT’L SEC. 90 (1997). 
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breach of the peace.90 Specifically, Article 41 provides for the use of 
measures not involving force, “[including] complete or partial interrup-
tion of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, 
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic rela-
tions.”91 
At the discretion of the U.N. Security Council, sanctions can be broken 
up into two categories: mandatory and voluntary. 92  While voluntary 
sanctions are imposed at the discretion of the state,93 mandatory sanc-
tions are binding international law, and states must enact legislation to 
put them into effect.94 This is because Article 24(1) of the U.N. Charter 
states that the Security Council’s responsibility is to maintain interna-
tional peace and security, and to this extent, grants the Security Council 
power to act on behalf of the other states.95 Furthermore, Article 25 of 
the Charter provides that members of the U.N. “agree to accept and carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter.”96 While both brands of sanctions are at the U.N.’s disposal, the 
literature, 97 as well as this Note, focuses on mandatory sanctions. In the 
years spanning 1991 to 1994, the U.N. Security Council imposed manda-
tory sanctions eight times, as opposed to twice between 1945 and 1990.98 
Yet, sanctions in general are a questionable practice and are particular-
ly ineffective in the case of NSAs. Despite the U.N.’s turning to sanc-
                                                                                                                                  
 90. U.N. Charter ch. VII.  
 91. U.N. Charter art. 41. The Security Council also has the power to call on the par-
ties involved to comply with the measures it deems necessary. Id. art. 40. The Security 
Council is also allowed to call for the use of force if it deems Article 41 measures to be 
inadequate. Id. art. 42. 
 92. Andrea Charron, UN Targeted Sanctions: Changing the Lens from Sanctions to 
the Crisis Context 8 (paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA’s 50th Annual 
Convention, “Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future,” May 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/1/4/1/p311419_inde
x.html (discussing how the methodology and targets of the sanctions are important to 
gauge success). 
 93. Since the sending state has the right to ignore voluntary sanctions, it becomes 
much more difficult to keep track of voluntary sanctions. Additionally, it is difficult to 
determine the effectiveness of voluntary sanctions, since the discretionary element im-
plies that they will not be applied uniformly. See id. 
 94. Id.; see also U.N. Charter arts. 24, 25. 
 95. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1. 
 96. Id. art. 25. 
 97. Voluntary sanctions have largely been ignored by literature on sanctions for a 
variety of reasons. Among them is that the term “sanctions” typically refers to mandatory 
sanctions. Furthermore, it is empirically easier to leave out voluntary sanctions because 
mandatory sanctions provide clearer data. See Charron, supra note 92, at 8. 
 98. Pape, supra note 89, at 90. 
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tions with increasing frequency, it is still unclear how frequently sanc-
tions actually bring about the desired changes in the target regime.99 Al-
though proponents typically argue that sanctions can be as effective as 
military force, 100  the first wave of research indicated that they were 
not.101 Logic dictates that the purpose behind sanctions is that the eco-
nomic burden placed on the sanctioned nation’s population will cause 
those citizens to grow dissatisfied with their government.102 This would 
in turn cause the nation’s citizens to place internal pressure on the regime 
to make the necessary changes desired by the U.N., leading to the lifting 
of the sanctions.103 Although recent studies have shown sanctions to be 
more successful, that is largely because the definition of “success” has 
been modified in a way that makes failure impossible.104 One economic 
analyst, David Baldwin, argues that whenever the target of attempted 
influence is forced to pay any price for noncompliance, the sanctions 
should be considered at least partially successful.105 Yet, this is blatantly 
a circular definition of success. If a sanction is the imposition of some 
burden on a country, and success is defined as burdening a noncompliant 
country, every instance of a sanction must be, by definition, a success. 
Baldwin’s definition is further flawed because it judges when “at-
tempted” influence is successful. Clearly, when success is attained by 
attempting something, it is not very difficult to achieve this standard. The 
problem with such an over-inclusive definition is that it clouds the real 
issue of whether desired changes actually resulted from the sanctions. 
In avoiding the trap of defining sanctions too broadly, it is important to 
distinguish between economic pressure and economic sanctions. Eco-
nomic pressure tends to refer to one of three strategies: (1) economic 
sanctions,106 (2) trade wars,107 and (3) economic warfare.108 Of the three, 
                                                                                                                                  
 99. Agress, supra note 89, at 1.    
 100. Although reasonable people might differ on how effective war is as an “instru-
ment of policy,” it is hard to argue for unnecessary wars. As such, the argument goes that 
sanctions present a more humane alternative to resolving conflicts. See Pape, supra note 
89, at 91 (citing DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT, 373 (1985)). 
 101. The first major wave of research done on the effectiveness of sanctions occurred 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Pape, supra note 89, at 91; see also Johan Galtung, On the 
Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia, 
19 WORLD POL. 378, 380 (1967). 
 102. Agress, supra note 89, at 1.  
 103. Under this view, economic sanctions might cause the citizens of a nation to en-
gage in activities such as strikes, demonstrations, riots, and maybe even civil war. See id.; 
see also Pape, supra note 89, at 94. 
 104. Pape, supra note 89, at 95.  
 105. Id. (citing DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT, 373 (1985)). 
 106. Defined infra note 109. 
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only economic sanctions seek to lower the economic well-being of a tar-
get for the purpose of coercing the target to change its political beha-
vior.109 So while some lump all three categories under the term economic 
sanctions, this is ill-advised.110 What policy-makers are actually interest-
ed in is when economic pressure brings about desired policy changes.111 
If the barometer for success remains focused on bringing about an actual 
regime or policy change, then the results remain less optimistic.112 His-
torically, U.N. sanctions regimes113 that target intrastate conflicts tend to 
place the bulk of the sanctions against the state, despite the fact that the 
focus of the literature is on the importance of targeted sanctions and 
sanctioning individuals and entities.114 In a case study of various sanc-
tions regimes, regimes involving intrastate conflicts 115  were in place 
longer than those involving interstate conflicts. 116 Furthermore, of the 
civil wars occurring between 1993 and 2003 that triggered U.N.-led med-
iation, settlement resulted only about twenty-five percent of the time.117 
As such, when sanctions are considered in an appropriate context, their 
effectiveness when NSAs are involved is questionable at best. 
A possible explanation for why NSAs are not as responsive to sanc-
tions is that they do not have the same responsibilities to their ‘citizens’ 
                                                                                                                                  
 107. A trade war is when a state threatens to, or actually inflicts, economic harm 
against another state in an attempt to persuade the other state to agree to terms that are 
more favorable to the coercing state. JOHN A. CONYBEARE, TRADE WARS: THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 3–6 (1987). 
 108. Economic warfare is the strategic weakening of a target’s economy to in turn 
afflict its military capabilities. This is typically done during a peacetime arms race or 
during war. Pape, supra note 89, at 94. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Placing economic pressure on a state carries one or both of two purposes: punish-
ing the target by depriving them of some material good, or making the target comply with 
some goal that the punishing parties feel is important. As achieving both these goals will 
not always be possible, it is imperative for the policy-maker to determine which one is 
more important. See Galtung, supra note 101, at 379. 
 112. Pape, supra note 89, at 95; see also Galtung, supra note 101, at 380 (pointing out 
that merely punishing a person is not likely to cause that person to comply with a given 
set of goals). 
 113. A sanction regime refers to the totality of Security Council resolutions creating, 
altering, or terminating sanctions that target a particular group or state. Charron, supra 
note 92, at 4. 
 114. Id. at 15. 
 115. Intrastate conflicts are confined within the borders of one state. Id. at 3. 
 116. Interstate conflicts involve two or more countries. Id at 3, 16. 
 117. High-Level Panel, supra note 19, ¶ 86. 
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as an actual government.118 Often times, breeding discontent with the 
ruling government might actually be their goal.119 Thus, the dissatisfac-
tion with the regime that the U.N. is hoping to foster by sanctioning the 
state may be the very same goal as the NSA’s. This is evidenced by the 
fact that sanctions placed on regimes that had pre-existing political or 
economic problems were of limited effect.120 Historically, these targeted 
regimes frequently stood to gain from persisting with their illegal activi-
ties.121 Some extremist groups actually stand to gain from regional insta-
bility resulting from conflicts, since state collapse or the emergence of 
ungoverned regions can create safe havens for NSAs.122 Intuitively, it 
makes little sense for an organization that is dedicated to illegal activity 
to start adhering to the law simply because the U.N. has asked them to. 
Sanctions are an exercise of international law, and criminals, by the na-
ture of their name, are law breakers. 
B. IHL and IHRL: Do They Even Apply? 
Hoping that NSAs will adhere to given rules or principles falsely pre-
supposes that they are actually bound by them. This is the biggest prob-
lem with holding NSAs responsible for violating international human 
rights law. International human rights law binds states,123 and this be-
comes the focus of the argument when NSAs enter the picture. Even 
prominent defenders of human rights admit there are good reasons that 
international human rights law does not apply to NSAs.124 For instance, 
human rights activist Liesbeth Zegveld acknowledges that it is inappro-
priate to hold NSAs responsible for violating international human rights 
                                                                                                                                  
 118. For instance, NSAs are unlikely to have the capacity to provide their members 
with certain rights like the access to courts. See Clapham, supra note 46, at 502. 
 119. This is the logical implication of a situation where the NSA is a rebel group seek-
ing to challenge the State’s power. See id. at 511. 
 120. Agress, supra note 89, at 11. 
 121. In some cases, warlords generate such a degree of profit from their economic 
networks, that they can actually withstand the economic sanctions. That is, it is more 
profitable for the warlords to persist in spite of the sanctions than to listen to the U.N. See 
id. at 11. 
 122. These were observations made by the U.S. Department of Defense in its annual 
strategy report in 2008. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY, 2–3 (2008) 
[hereinafter U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY], available at 
www.defense.gov/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf. 
 123. See Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 33. 
 124. There is some support indicating that NSAs do have human rights obligations, but 
the majority of the support stems from international soft law bodies, pronouncements of 
NGOs, and scholarly writing. See Sassòli, supra note 11, at 3. 
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law, as these are rights that people hold exclusively against the state.125 
While some scholars argue that NSAs have responsibilities under human 
rights law because some of them have elements of government authori-
ty,126 this argument still leaves the door open for rebel groups that do not 
take on such authority to circumvent these obligations.127 
Despite the fact that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says 
that “everyone has duties to the community,”128 the traditional view is 
that human rights laws bind states, not individuals.129 A report from the 
U.N. Economic and Social Council admitted that although all parties felt 
that NSAs should be responsible for violations of international humanita-
rian law and international criminal law, some felt that only states could 
violate international human rights law.130 As such, the Council found it 
important to proceed with caution, so as not to mistakenly suggest that 
NSAs may be accountable under international human rights law.131 If the 
U.N. does not believe that NSAs should be held accountable for viola-
tions of human rights laws, there is little reason to think that the NSAs 
will take the prerogative and bind themselves to these laws. 
On the question of whether international humanitarian law binds 
NSAs, those that argue in the affirmative point to Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions.132 Specifically, Article 3 includes the wording 
“each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the 
following provisions.”133 At face value, this indicates that NSAs should 
                                                                                                                                  
 125. Clapham, supra note 46, at 503 (citing LIESBETH ZEGVELD, ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 49–51 (2002)). 
 126. Id. at 502 (citing Christian Tomuschat, The Applicability of Human Rights Law to 
Insurgent Movements, in KRISENSICHERUNG UND HUMANITARER SCHUTZ—CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION  573–91, 588 (Horst Fisher et al. eds., 
2004)) (arguing that in some instances, elements of government authority might fall into 
the hands of a rebel movement). 
 127. See id. at 502 (pointing out that it is a well-known principle that governments and 
international organizations are reluctant to admit that rebel groups are acting in a gov-
ernment-like way). 
 128. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/217(III), art. 29 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 129. William A. Schabas, Punishment of Non-State Actors in Non-International Armed 
Conflict, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 907, 908 (2003). 
 130. The Right to a Remedy, supra note 47, ¶ 18. 
 131. Principle 3 of the report sought to distinguish between international humanitarian 
and human rights law, and between state actors and NSAs. The report admits that legal 
and administrative measures may not always be sufficient for prevention purposes. Id. ¶¶ 
14–21. 
 132. See Sassòli, supra note 11, at 3. 
 133. Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316. 
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be bound by international humanitarian law. However, that claim also 
completely overlooks reasoning from the perspective of NSAs for why 
they are not. Specifically, arguments that they are bound to international 
treaties may be rejected by parties that had no role in the process of their 
enactment.134 
Some scholars argue that it is a simple matter of the NSAs being a 
component of a state which accepted a treaty and, as such, are compelled 
to abide by said treaty.135 However, arguments that they should be bound 
by national laws are irrelevant considering many NSAs refuse to ac-
knowledge the state’s legitimacy to make laws in the first place.136 While 
some NSAs may be coerced to follow international laws if they have as-
pirations of becoming the governing state, many others are simply con-
tent with gaining control over specific areas or the opportunity to “run 
organized criminal activity.”137 Thus, it intuitively follows that where a 
group’s specific goal is to violate a given set of laws, they are both aware 
of the repercussions and are either not concerned, or are willing to accept 
them. In either scenario, where the law’s purpose is to prevent violation 
by parties who refuse to accept its legitimacy, it is destined to fail. 
There is, however, the argument that since customary international 
humanitarian law is founded on practice and is applicable against every-
one, the fact that NSAs did not ratify these customary laws is irrele-
vant.138 Yet currently, only state activities can create customary interna-
tional law.139 The activities of NSAs are only considered when they suc-
ceed in becoming the ruling government of their state.140 Thus, this ar-
gument is defective because it still tries to pigeon hole NSAs in a set of 
laws they have no part in creating. Whether the laws are signed on paper 
and created formally or enacted in a de facto manner, they are still a 
                                                                                                                                  
 134. Clapham, supra note 46, at 511; see also Sassòli, supra note 11, at 17. 
 135. This idea suggests that the state has accepted a rule and is bound by that rule. In 
turn, the state is made up of not only the government, but of the entire population includ-
ing both individuals and collective groups. See Eric David, International Humanitarian 
Law and Non-State Actors: Synopsis of the Issue, 27 COLLEGIUM (SPECIAL ISSUE) 27, 35 
(2003). 
 136. See Clapham, supra note 46, at 511.  
 137. Id.; cf. David, supra note 135, at 35–36 (arguing that international humanitarian 
law applies to national liberation movements where they seek to be recognized as the 
legitimate government). 
 138. See Henckaerts, Binding Armed Opposition Groups, supra note 39, at 128. 
 139. Id. 
 140. This limitation ignores the important role that activities of NSAs who do not suc-
ceed in becoming the official government play in international law. Given that by defini-
tion, a NSA must be involved in non-international armed conflicts, failed rebel groups 
could dictate the conduct of future NSAs in such conflicts. Id. 
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creation of states. Furthermore, even if the argument to give customary 
law universal recognition is accepted, this still overlooks the fact that 
when the laws are applicable to NSAs, there is seldom a forum to enforce 
the laws against them.141 As the next Section points out, the creation of 
such forums is one reason why international criminal law is so important 
for holding NSAs accountable for breaking the law. 
C. The Best Hope 
Given that the antiquity of the law is one of the problems with policing 
NSAs, international criminal law is particularly interesting because of the 
recent opportunity for development. When the Rome Statute was put into 
force on July 1, 2002,142 it included a predestined review.143 For this pur-
pose, from May 31 to June 10, 2010, Kampala, Uganda hosted a confe-
rence for the ASP to the ICC.144 One item on the agenda at this review 
was establishing a legal definition for the crime of aggression.145 Prior to 
this review, the Rome Statute failed to define the term aggression, mak-
ing jurisdiction over the crime inoperable.146 Although the ASP drafted 
an amendment defining the crime, the court cannot exercise this jurisdic-
tion until January 1, 2017 at the earliest.147 Since international criminal 
law is arguably the most capable branch of law at dealing with NSAs, the 
ASP missed a unique opportunity to update the legal mechanisms go-
verning conflicts by adopting a state focused definition of aggression. 
One reason international criminal law stands out from international hu-
manitarian and human rights law is because at its core, it is criminal law. 
Unlike the other two branches of law, criminal law is implicitly applied 
against people that disagree with it. The emergence of international crim-
inal law is related to the rise of a strong central international power in the 
same way that national criminal law is linked to the rise of the state.148 
For example, in a local government, laws criminalizing murder and arson 
are created by the public for the welfare of the public, irrelevant of how 
                                                                                                                                  
 141. Sassòli, supra note 11, at 2. 
 142. Rome Statute, supra note 51.   
 143. This review is planned to include, but not be limited to, “the list of crimes con-
tained in article 5,” and is to be open to “those participating in the ASP.” Id. art. 123. 
 144. Review Conference of the Rome Statute, supra note 15. 
 145. Also planned for Uganda is: a discussion of the court’s performance thus far, a 
review of article 124 which allows nations to postpone the court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
over war crimes, and two amendments to the Rome Statute proposed by Belgium and 
Mexico. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See Rome Statute Amendments, supra note 17, art. 15.  
 148. Mégret, supra note 16, at 2. 
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murderers and arsonists feel about them. Expanding this idea to the in-
ternational context, international criminal law represents certain values 
that the international community holds with such esteem that they “tran-
scend its typical value neutrality.”149 Since this area of law is geared to 
criminalize individual misconduct, there is no reason it cannot criminal-
ize the misconduct of individuals not associated with the state.150 Where 
the argument that NSAs never agreed to the treaties might effectively 
explain why international humanitarian or human rights law do not ap-
ply, the idea of international criminal law is to police individuals, not the 
states.151 Thus, there are no legal or logical problems with criminalizing 
aggression by NSAs;152 the only obstacle comes from the actual defini-
tion. In contrast to the typical pattern of state-centered international law, 
defining aggression under international criminal law means individuals 
can be charged with the crime.153 
For this reason, the definition of aggression adopted by the ASP to the 
Rome Statute limits the powers of the branch of law most effective at 
policing NSAs. In contrast to the laws of international armed conflicts, 
parallel laws in internal armed conflicts were poorly developed until the 
1990s.154 Prior to the Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals,155 there was no 
international treaty even imposing criminal responsibility on individuals 
not associated with the state, let alone actually holding them accounta-
ble.156 In the same vein that these tribunals have been used to prosecute 
                                                                                                                                  
 149. This usually results from a “densification” of the international system. In such a 
situation certain principles become so prized that they “pierce through the sovereign veil” 
and criminalize conduct that would traditionally be left entirely to national governments. 
See id. at 2–3. 
 150. Antonio Cassese, On Some Problematic Aspects of the Crime of Aggression, 20 
LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 841, 846 (2007). 
 151. Mégret, supra note 16, at 4. 
 152. As a general principle, international criminal law seeks to protect the international 
community from the acts of specific individuals. Thus, there is nothing in the functioning 
of this branch of law that would restrain a court from prosecuting a NSA for a particular 
crime. See Cassese, supra note 150, at 846. 
 153. Id. (arguing that crime of aggression should be applicable to NSAs, since the 
body of law that is defining the crime is already focused on individuals). 
 154. ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OF ARMED CONFLICTS 257 (2008). 
 155. These tribunals, established in the early 1990s, will be discussed in detail, infra 
Part III. 
 156. There is a distinction between responsibility and accountability. Responsibility 
refers to when a law is applicable to a given person, whereas accountability refers to ac-
tually enforcing the laws after a person violates them. Without first establishing responsi-
bility, there can be no accountability. See Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability of Non-State 
Actors in International Law, 27 COLLEGIUM (SPECIAL ISSUE) 153, 153–54 (2003). 
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NSAs for violating international criminal law, the Rome Statute has em-
powered the ICC to enforce similar rules.157 As such, the jurisprudence 
flowing from the Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals, as well as the defini-
tion of war crimes under the Rome Statute are accredited as predominant 
reasons for the merger of the laws of international armed conflicts and 
the laws governing non-international conflicts.158 Currently, with limited 
exceptions, there is at least a presumption that the laws of international 
armed conflict apply to internal conflicts.159 
In this manner, international criminal law has actually been used as a 
vehicle of enforcement for other branches. Genocide,160 crimes against 
humanity and war crimes are among the crimes listed under the Rome 
Statute.161 Crimes against humanity are the wide spread targeting of civi-
lians for acts of murder, enslavement, torture, etc.162 War crimes are in 
turn defined as any grave violation of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949.163 The U.N. has explicitly found that genocide is a violation of 
human rights, 164 and acts such as torture and enslavement have been 
called human rights violations by the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.165 Additionally, since the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
is one of the central treaties of international humanitarian law,166 war 
crimes are clearly also a violation of humanitarian law. Thus, the ICC 
has recognized that at least certain violations of international humanita-
rian and human rights law are criminal. The Commission on Human 
                                                                                                                                  
 157. Id. at 155; see also Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 28.  
 158. Internal armed conflicts implicitly involve NSAs, and armed conflicts implicitly 
involve the use of force. Thus, developments in this area of law provide analogous sup-
port for how the use of force by NSAs should be treated in an international setting. KOLB 
& HYDE, supra note 154, at 259–60. 
 159. These exceptions are the status of combatants and prisoners of war, and the laws 
of occupied territories. Id. at 259. 
 160. In sum and substance, this crime is defined as an act of violence committed with 
“intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” 
Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 6. 
 161. Id. art. 5. 
 162. Id. art. 7. 
 163. Id. art. 8. 
 164. The U.N. has also found that the crimes which constitute genocide might also 
qualify as crimes against humanity or war crimes, depending on the context in which they 
are committed. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR ON THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 
http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/adviser/genocide.shtml (last visited Feb 22, 2011). 
 165. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered 
into force Mar. 23, 1976) (recognizing that individuals have duties and responsibilities to 
others in the community to which they belong). 
 166. See Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 30.  
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Rights has also formally acknowledged that individual responsibility for 
human rights violations should be pursued by criminal courts.167 The im-
plication of this recognition is that while scholars debate whether those 
branches of law apply to NSAs, the ICC already stands as an institute 
capable of prosecuting NSAs for those violations. 
As such, international criminal law has become arguably the main ve-
hicle used for ensuring NSAs are held accountable for international 
crimes.168 Examples include a UK conviction of an Afghan warlord for 
torture.169 Further evidence is offered by the Rwanda and Yugoslavia 
tribunals’ prosecution of members from various NSAs accused of com-
mitting crimes against humanity. 170  The aforementioned tribunals 
claimed their first successful conviction of a leader of a non-state group 
in 1999.171 To date, Yugoslavia has adjudicated 121 cases (both NSAs 
and state actors)172 while Rwanda has adjudicated 49.173 As such, both 
courts are recognized as an important step in holding NSAs accountable 
for international crimes.174 Furthermore, the ICC should build on what 
these other IMTs have started. As the Rome Statute’s entry into force in 
2002 marked an important step in deterring war crimes,175 the ICC has 
the opportunity to expand on the success of past tribunals because its 
reach is not limited territorially or by time. 
                                                                                                                                  
 167. Schabas, supra note 129, at 908; see also Impunity, U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights, C.H.R. res. 1998/54, ESCOR Supp. No. 3, at 177, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 
(Apr. 17, 1998) (discussing methods for combating impunity towards human rights viola-
tions). 
 168. See REDRESS TRUST, TORTURE BY NON-STATE ACTORS: A PRIMER (2006) [herei-
nafter TORTURE BY NON-STATE ACTORS], available at 
http://www.irct.org/Files//Filer/IPIP/training/Torture_by_Non-State_Actors-Primer.pdf. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Zegveld, supra note 156, at 155.   
 172. Eleven people were acquitted, sixty-one were sentenced, thirteen were referred to 
national jurisdictions for prosecution, and thirty-six had their indictments withdrawn or 
are deceased. Key Figures of ICTY Cases, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures (last visited Jan. 15, 
2011). 
 173. Thirty-one cases ended in a successful prosecution, nine are pending appeal, eight 
resulted in acquittals, and one person died before the trial ended. See International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda, Status of Cases, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, 
http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
 174. See In-Depth Reports: Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict, IRINNEWS.ORG 
(March 2003), 
http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=31&ReportId=70542 (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2011). 
 175. Id. 
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At present, the ICC is monitoring four situations: The Democratic Re-
public of Congo, The Central African Republic, Uganda, and Darfur, 
Sudan.176 Of a combined thirteen cases in these four situations, the ICC 
has five of their targets in custody, either standing or awaiting trial.177 
Although the outcomes of these cases are far from determined, the fact 
that these men have been removed from the arena where they committed 
an assortment of horrifying crimes is a positive step. That they will be 
forced to face justice is even more reason to applaud the efforts and po-
tential of the ICC. 
III. THE 2010 FALLOUT: THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
In 2010, the ASP to the Rome Statute met to review the ICC and 
amend the Rome Statute.178 Article 5 of the Rome Statute gives the ICC 
jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and aggression.179 However, while the court exercises authority 
over the first three crimes, Article 5(2) provides that the ICC will only 
exercise jurisdiction over aggression after it is defined.180 Created at the 
same time as the Rome Statute’s enactment, a Special Working Group 
(“SWG”) was tasked with filling this void.181 In 2008, a discussion paper 
was distributed by the SWG containing its proposed definition of aggres-
sion.182 The definition that passed in 2010 is identical to the one distri-
buted in 2008 and establishes the elements of the crime as: (1) the plan-
ning, preparation, initiation or execution of the use of armed force, (2) a 
crime conducted by an individual who has a high-level of control over 
the political or military actions of a state, and (3) committed against 
another sovereign state.183 The two most disappointing aspects of this 
amendment are that it focuses exclusively on individuals in a policy-
                                                                                                                                  
 176. See ICC: All Situations, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, 
http://www2.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/ (last visited Jan. 15, 
2011). 
 177. See ICC: All Cases, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Cases/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
 178. For details of this conference, see supra Part II(c). 
 179. Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 5. 
 180. This was even accounted for by the Rome Statute. Article 121 provides proce-
dures for amending the statute, while Article 123 provides for a mandatory review seven 
years after the Statute goes into force. Rome Statute, supra note 51, arts. 121, 123. 
 181. The review session scheduled for 2010 was likewise agreed upon at the same time 
this group was created. In the News, supra note 14. 
 182. Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Discussion Paper on the Crime of Aggression Pro-
posed by the Chairman (Revision June 2008), ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/2 (May 14, 2008) 
[hereinafter ICC Discussion Paper]. 
 183. Compare id., with Rome Statute Amendments, supra note 17, art. 15(2). 
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making capacity and restricts the crime of aggression to something only 
states are capable of. 
Given the current international climate, this amendment falls short of 
meeting the goals of the original Rome Statute and international criminal 
law in general and fails to keep up with the reality of evolving conflict 
patterns. Part A of this Section discusses the impact of a working defini-
tion of aggression and which parties will be implicated by the new defi-
nition. Next, Part B points out that this definition steps away from the 
norms and principles which have governed international criminal law 
practically since its creation. 
A. Aggression: What’s in a Word? 
Formally defining the act of aggression under the Rome Statute puts 
the initiation of military action within the purview of the law. Aggression 
differs from other war crimes because it is a crime of jus ad bellum, 
while the others are crimes of jus in bello.184 Whereas the latter refers to 
criminal violations during the execution of a war, the former refers to 
criminal violations in initiating a war.185 Thus, even if a state was to con-
duct a military operation in a legal manner, its mere initiation might be 
against the law. This idea is not new; dating back to the Nuremberg IMT, 
aggression was called the “mother of all crimes.”186 Furthermore, the 
U.N. General Assembly met specifically to define the crime, highlighting 
the importance of a definition for the “most serious and dangerous form 
of the illegal use of force.”187 The General Assembly adopted a definition 
of aggression in 1974.188 
In adopting the 2010 amendment on aggression, the ASP missed a val-
uable opportunity to improve the laws policing NSAs. By enacting an 
amendment defining the crime of aggression, the ICC will finally be able 
to exercise the inoperable jurisdiction it has held since 2002.189 The con-
ference had the opportunity to update the outdated norms governing the 
                                                                                                                                  
 184. Mégret, supra note 16, at 13. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Under the Nuremberg IMT, aggression was embodied by the larger crime of 
“crimes against the peace.” See id. 
 187. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 188. In sum and substance, the U.N. defined aggression as “the use of armed force by a 
state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set 
out in this Definition.” Id. art. 1. 
 189. See id.; see also In the News, supra note 14. This is contingent on approval by the 
State Parties to the Rome Statute come Jan 1, 2017. Rome Statute Amendments, supra 
note 17, art 15(2). 
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use of force by NSAs190 while improving the international community’s 
ability to hold NSAs accountable for humanitarian violations. Yet, the 
definition which was accepted overlooks the reality that NSAs are in-
creasingly responsible for acts violating international laws. As the High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change stated, “[t]he norms 
governing the use of force by non-state actors have not kept pace with 
those pertaining to states.”191 Thus, the question that must be considered 
is whether aggression is a crime that only states are capable of commit-
ting. With this question in mind, an examination of past conflicts indi-
cates that the amendment, if approved in 2017,192 will lead to undesirable 
outcomes. 
For instance, activities of terrorist groups indicate that NSAs are capa-
ble of using armed force on an international level. Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter provides for the use of self-defense when a state suffers an armed 
attack.193 Using self-help measures is allowed so long as the Security 
Council has not taken action yet.194 Although the Security Council never 
explicitly approved of the U.S. attack on Afghanistan, there is little doubt 
that the 9/11 terrorist act was of sufficient gravity to constitute an armed 
attack under the U.N. Charter.195 Thus, it is evident that at least some 
NSAs are capable of using armed force on an international level. Yet, 
while the purpose of criminalizing aggression is to police the initiation of 
force, using the new definition retrospectively evidences that members of 
Al-Qaida would escape responsibility for criminal aggression. Given that 
the resultant damages are the same, it is difficult to accept such an out-
come. 
On the other hand, humanitarian intervention196 might be a criminal 
act. Again looking to the past, in 1999 the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (“NATO”) bombed Yugoslavia without authority from the U.N. 
                                                                                                                                  
 190. High-Level Panel, supra note 19, ¶ 159. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Rome Statute Amendments, supra note 17, art 15(2). 
 193. “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security.” U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 194. Norman G. Printer Jr., The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors Under Interna-
tional Law: An Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in Yemen, 8 UCLA J. INT’L L. & 
FOREIGN AFF. 331, 354 (2003). 
 195. Id. at 353. 
 196. Humanitarian intervention envisions the use of armed force, not in self-defense, 
but rather as a means of preventing widespread human rights violations. Sean D. Murphy, 
Criminalizing Humanitarian Intervention, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 341, 341 (2009). 
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Security Council.197 This was defended by former U.S. President Clinton 
as “just and necessary,” and done in reaction to ethnic cleansing of Alba-
nians in the Serbian province of Kosovo.198 Despite such rationalizations, 
NATO is an organization of states, this type of bombing is actually listed 
as an example of unlawful aggression,199 and Yugoslavia was a sove-
reign state.200 As such, NATO’s efforts to end the ethnic cleansing201 
may very well have constituted criminal aggression.202 Whether unilater-
al humanitarian intervention should ever be justified is a controversial 
issue and most scholars and states believe it should not.203 This Note 
makes no attempt to weigh in on that debate, but criminalizing humanita-
rian intervention while simultaneously tying the ICC’s hands with re-
gards to large-scale terrorist attacks hardly seems like a consistent way of 
policing the use of armed force. 
In the same manner that the new amendment is under-inclusive, there 
is an argument that including NSAs under the crime of aggression might 
have undesirable consequences. Mainly, there is concern about how de-
velopments in criminalizing aggression might affect the right to armed 
struggle.204 The right to armed struggle refers to people under “occupa-
tion, apartheid, and alien domination,” and their ability to use armed 
force against a suppressive regime.205 Ignoring that whether there is a 
right to armed struggle is contested by some,206 this is not a compelling 
                                                                                                                                  
 197. Gavin Murray-Miller, Beyond Tragedy: NATO’s Intervention in the Former Yu-
goslavia 20–21 (unpublished thesis, California State University, Fresno) (on file with 
California State University, Fresno, History Department). 
 198. Id. at 21 (justifying the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo against claims that it 
was merely an act of the U.S. and NATO exporting their own ideals). 
 199. “Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another 
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State.”  ICC 
Discussion Paper, supra note 182, art. 8 bis(2)(b). 
 200. See Murray-Miller, supra note 197, at 22. 
 201. See id. at 20. 
 202. Murphy, supra note 196, at 366–367 (arguing that if the ICC does not prosecute 
attacks like NATO’s incursion into Kosovo as aggression under the SWG’s definition of 
the crime, they will in a sense be showing approval of unilateral humanitarian interven-
tion). 
 203. Id. at 345.  
 204. Liaquat Ali Khan, Legal Commentary: The Changing Right of Armed Struggle, 
BALT. CHRON. & SENTINEL (Sept. 16, 2005), 
www.baltimorechronicle.com/2005/091605AliKhan.shtml (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) 
(discussing how developments in international law, particularly in response to terrorism 
and the war on terror, are muddling the right to armed struggle). 
 205. See id. 
 206. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, ¶ 160 (discussing the major stopping 
points for coming to an agreement for a definition of terrorism). 
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reason to have a blanket exclusion of NSAs from the crime of aggres-
sion. The ICC has a built in discretionary valve; it can only hear cases for 
“the most serious crimes.”207 Additionally, the new definition of aggres-
sion is restricted to acts “which by its character, gravity and scale, consti-
tutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the [U.N.].”208 The use of 
threshold language like ‘most serious’ in the Rome Statute209 and ‘ma-
nifest violation’ in the amendment210 indicates that the ICC will be allot-
ted discretion in prosecution. Thus, it is imaginable that if a liberation 
movement were to come to the ICC’s attention, they could choose to not 
prosecute them for aggression. Since the right to armed struggle is pre-
sently unimpeded by the U.N. Charter or Resolution 3314,211 there is no 
reason to think that discretionary prosecution under the ICC would im-
pact this right. Thus, whereas the ICC can work around an over-inclusive 
definition covering all NSAs, an under-inclusive definition completely 
carving out NSAs leaves the court no say in the matter. 
Another potential problem with recognizing NSAs as capable of ag-
gression is the implications on the right to self-defense. Recognizing 
something as an act of aggression implies an armed attack occurred,212 
and an armed attack typically implicates reprisal under Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter.213 Since a NSA exists within the boundaries of a state, 
there is concern about retaliation against a state that houses the NSA, but 
who was not involved in the attack.214 Ignoring that the U.S.’s reaction to 
9/11 already suggests the legality of such responses,215 which is not nec-
essarily a bad outcome. One state’s sufferance of another’s sovereignty 
requires that each polices the activities of its residents that might harm 
civilians within and without its borders.216 A core principle of interna-
                                                                                                                                  
 207. Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 1. 
 208. Rome Statute Amendments, supra note 17, art 8(1).  
 209. Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 1. 
 210. Rome Statute Amendments, supra note 17, art 8(1). 
 211. Kahn, supra note 204, at 2 (arguing that despite the developments associated with 
the war on terror, international law has not formally “repudiated the right to armed strug-
gle”). 
 212. Under the SWG’s proposed definition of aggression, the crime involves the use of 
armed force. See ICC Discussion Paper, supra note 182, art 8 bis(2). 
 213. U.N. Charter art. 51 (the occurrence of an armed attack is the necessary trigger to 
justify a state engaging in self defense). 
 214. Eric A. Heinze, Nonstate Actors in the International Legal Order: The Israeli-
Hezbollah Conflict and the Law of Self-Defense, 15 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 87, 88 (2009). 
 215. See id. 
 216. See Lloyd R. Cohen, The Missing Currency of Israeli/Palestinian Negotiations 3 
(Geo. Mason L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 09-45, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1467863 (discussing a hypothetical situation in which terrorists 
based in Canada conducted attacks across the border into the U.S. on a regular basis).  
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tional law is that when one state fails to protect its neighbors from crimi-
nal activity stemming from within that state’s borders, it forfeits its right 
to have its sovereignty respected.217 
While such a principle might seem unduly harsh, it could in fact serve 
a positive purpose. For instance, states may be discouraged from ac-
quiescing in the illegal activities of NSAs within their borders.218 Where 
a state knows it will be the target of retaliatory self-defense, it might be 
motivated to take decisive steps to actively circumvent NSAs suspected 
of engaging in the illegal use of force.219 To prevent such situations, 
many states have provisions in their criminal codes forbidding the state’s 
citizens from engaging in aggressive acts against other sovereign 
states.220 Furthermore, there is still the threshold issue. Including NSAs 
in the definition of criminal aggression would not automatically trigger 
the right to self-defense against all NSAs; the ICC has discretion to 
charge an individual of committing the crime. In a situation where the 
ICC does not charge a NSA with committing aggression, armed conflicts 
under Article 51 would not be implicated. Thus, the normative frame-
work of the ICC is equipped to handle the potential dangers of finding 
NSAs capable of aggression. 
B. State vs. State . . . Really? 
Given that both international criminal law and the Rome Statute focus 
on the individual, irrelevant of his or her affiliation, this amendment’s 
focus on the state is contradictory to international criminal law. The 
Rome Statute declares it “shall apply equally to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity.”221 Yet, the SWG insisted on keep-
ing the “control or direct” requirement as part of the definition, claiming 
it coincides with the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs.222 However, the actual 
                                                                                                                                  
 217. See id. 
 218. See id. at 4. 
 219. See id. 
 220. Japan makes it a crime to prepare or plot to “wage war privately upon a foreign 
State.” Austria’s criminal code forbids anyone on its soil from undertaking in acts to 
“change the constitution of a foreign state or to divide territory which is part of a foreign 
state by force or threat of force.”  Sweden forbids a person from, “by violent means or 
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Joachim Gewehr, Defining Aggression for the International Criminal Court: A Proposal 
(Jan. 2003) (unpublished L.L.M. dissertation, University of Cape Town) (on file with 
University of Cape Town). 
 221. Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 27(1). 
 222. See Kevin Jon Heller, Retreat from Nuremberg: The Leadership Requirement in 
the Crime of Aggression, 18 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 477, 479 (2007). 
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case law flowing from these tribunals tells a different story.223 The juri-
sprudence of international tribunals and courts as well as relevant prac-
tice indicates that NSAs can incur criminal responsibility, both indepen-
dently and through the grounds of command responsibility.224 It is an 
anomaly that this amendment defines aggression as a crime that is com-
mitted not only by states, against states, but also only by individuals in “a 
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or 
military action of a State.”225 
Both historically and today, the prime subject of international criminal 
law is the individual.226 The Nuremburg Trials famously pointed out that 
“crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can 
the provisions of international law be enforced.”227 Not only was the use 
of “abstract entities” presumably a reference to states, but this dictum is 
often cited as the birth of contemporary international criminal law.228 
Furthermore, the Nuremberg IMT provided that the crime of aggression 
could be committed by people not formally associated with the Nazi par-
ty,229 and that “Hitler could not make aggressive war by himself. He had 
to have cooperation of statesman, military leaders, diplomats, and busi-
nessman.”230 Clearly the inclusion of businessman with statesman and 
military leaders shows the Nuremberg IMT was not preoccupied with 
state actors, let alone exclusively with high level leaders. By restricting 
the focus of an international crime under the purview of the ICC in ac-
cordance with the 2010 amendment, the very principles on which inter-
national criminal law was founded are put into question. 
Following World War II, the Statutes of the Nuremburg and Tokyo 
IMTs were amongst the first to take aim at making the initiation of mili-
                                                                                                                                  
 223. See id.  
 224. See TORTURE BY NON-STATE ACTORS, supra note 168 (comparing the internation-
al frameworks of international humanitarian, human rights, and criminal law, and their 
application to NSAs). 
 225. ICC Discussion Paper, supra note 182, 8 bis(1). 
 226. See Mégret, supra note 16, at 4.  
 227. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL: PROCEEDINGS 466 (1946), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-XXII.pdf. 
 228. It is also believed that the founding principle of the Nuremberg IMT is the pu-
nishment of the individual, not the associated state. See Mégret, supra note 16, at 4. 
 229. See Heller, supra note 222, at 480. 
 230. WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS, NUREMBURG, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 62 (1947) available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Nazi-opinion-judgment.pdf. 
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tary conflicts an international crime.231 Specifically, the Statute for the 
Nuremberg IMT described “crimes against the peace” as “planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in vi-
olation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances, or participat-
ing in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of the fore-
going.”232 This definition is particularly interesting because, in addition 
to explicitly using the term “aggression,” it does not mention the state, 
nor does it reference rank. Thus, comparing the definition found in the 
Statute of the Nuremberg IMT against the one in the 2010 amendment 
indicates that the ICC is stepping away from principles elucidated by the 
Nuremberg IMT. 
A more liberal reading of the Nuremberg IMT’s definition is evidenced 
by the successful prosecution of Artur Greiser for crimes against the 
peace. While serving as one of the leaders of the Nazi party in Danzig, 
Greiser and other Danzig Leaders worked in conjunction with the Central 
German Authorities to plan, direct, and execute attacks against Poland.233 
He was prosecuted by the Supreme National Tribunal of Poland, which 
relied on various elements of International Law, including the Statute of 
the Nuremberg IMT. 234  Despite linking Greiser to Hitler as a co-
conspirator, the Tribunal also held that his violations of international law 
were a result of “Hitler’s orders,” and came as a result of “direct and in-
direct orders from the accused.”235 The Tribunal’s finding that Greiser 
violated international law by acting on Hitler’s orders seems to implicitly 
signal that they did not consider him acting in the capacity of a policy-
maker.236 In the context of the new definition, the conviction of Artur 
Greiser shows that international criminal law has long committed itself to 
                                                                                                                                  
 231. Mark Drumbl, The Push to Criminalize Aggression: Something Lost Amid the 
Gains?, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Working Paper No. 2008-43, 4 
(2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301003 (providing a background on the 
crime of aggression to provide context for the present debate over the SWG’s definition). 
 232. Nuremberg IMT, supra note 72, art. 6(a). 
 233. Drumbl, supra note 231, at 9. 
 234. Sources of law that the Tribunal relied on included: international treaties, the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, the Statute of the Nuremberg IMT, and a non-
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for the policies behind such orders. See Drumbl, supra note 231, at 11. 
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holding the individual responsible for their own actions, rather than just 
targeting the relevant policy-maker through command responsibility. 
Further evidence on the Nuremberg IMT’s liberal stance on defining 
aggression is provided by the prosecution of two NSAs. Although both 
men were acquitted, Hjalmar Schacht237 and Albert Speer238 were both 
businessmen prosecuted for crimes against the peace.239 In both cases, 
the IMT specifically stated that private economic actors could be respon-
sible for the crime of aggression.240 Schacht was only acquitted because 
the prosecution failed to prove he had actually taken part in the Nazi Par-
ty’s plan to wage aggressive war, or that he had knowledge that his work 
to rearm Germany was part of such a plan.241 Similarly, Speer was ac-
quitted because he began his work after the war had commenced, so he 
could not have been part of the conspiracy to wage aggressive war.242 
What both have in common is that they were acquitted because the pros-
ecution failed to prove elements of the crime charged, not because of 
their status as private economic actors. While neither man belonged to a 
non-state armed group, both were recognized as capable of committing 
the crime of aggression while serving in a non-government capacity.243 
International law following the Nuremberg IMT also indicates that 
NSAs can commit the crime of aggression. The principles established by 
the Nuremberg IMT were reaffirmed two months later when the Allied 
Powers enacted Control Council Law No. 10 (“CCL 10”).244 CCL 10 
was meant to codify the underlying principles of the IMT judgments,245 
while establishing additional IMTs in the occupied German zones under 
                                                                                                                                  
 237. Schacht was the President of the Reichbank from 1933–1939, Minister of eco-
nomics from 1934–1937, and Plenipotentiary General for War Economy from 1935–
1937. However, he began to lose authority in 1936, had no important government posi-
tion by 1939, and was in a concentration camp from 1944 until the end of the war. Secre-
tariat, Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression, 38–49, U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1 (Jan. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Historical Review]. 
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Planning Board in 1942.” Id. at 41. 
 239. These two men are accredited for being the most responsible for Germany’s 
rearmament. See Heller, supra note 222, at 480. 
 240. Id. 
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 242. Id. 
 243. See id. at 480; see also Historical Review, supra note 237, at 39, 41. 
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 245. Id. 
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U.S. and French control. 246  In this vein, the definitions for “crimes 
against the peace” were very similar under the Nuremberg IMT and CCL 
10,247 with the latter arguably taking an even more liberal approach. CCL 
10 stated that the actions listed, which constituted waging aggressive 
war, were non-exhaustive.248 The law provided that the crime of aggres-
sion could be committed by a person who “held a high political, civil or 
military (including General Staff) position in Germany or in one of its 
Allies, co-belligerents or satellites or held high position in the financial, 
industrial or economic life of any such country.”249 Since the Nuremberg 
IMT found NSAs were capable of committing the crime of aggression, it 
logically follows that CCL 10’s more expansive definition does as well. 
Moreover, the fact that the terms “co-belligerents or satellites” are listed 
in addition to Germany and its allies provides further evidence that the 
crime encompassed NSAs. 
The results of the post-World War II IMTs reached beyond the Allied 
Powers, and were formally indoctrinated by the U.N. On December 11, 
1946, the U.N. passed Resolution 95, which affirmed the “principles of 
the international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal and the judgment of the Tribunal.”250 As such, all states that were 
party to the U.N. at that time accepted the definitions provided by the 
Nuremberg IMT, as well as how such definitions were interpreted.251 
Between the IMTs relating to World War II and the creation of the ICC 
are the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (“ICTFY”). Prior 
to 1990, the question of command responsibility for the leaders of NSAs 
had never come before an international tribunal.252 In the Aleksovski 
case253 of 1999, the ICTFY ignored arguments that command responsi-
                                                                                                                                  
 246. See id.; see also Historical Review, supra note 237, at 44. 
 247. See Historical Review, supra note 237, at 44. 
 248. Id. at 45. 
 249. NUREMBERG TRIALS FINAL REPORT APPENDIX D: CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 
art. II (2)(f) (Dec. 20, 1945), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp. 
 250. Cassese, supra note 150, at 842; see also G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/95 
(I) (Dec. 11, 1946). 
 251. See Cassese, supra note 150, at 842. 
 252. Zegveld, supra note 156, at 154. 
 253. In The Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, the accused was a prison warden, who 
was responsible for subjecting prisoners to “excessive and cruel interrogation, physical 
and psychological harm, forced labour (digging trenches), in hazardous circumstances, 
being used as human shields and some were murdered or otherwise killed.” Prosecutor v. 
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yu-
goslavia June 25, 1999) [hereinafter Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T], available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4146e8ba2.pdf. 
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bility could only apply to people in official roles.254 The court held that 
“superior responsibility is thus not reserved for official authorities,” and 
instead extended liability to an individual “acting de facto as a supe-
rior.”255 Furthermore, the court paid no attention to whether the conflict 
was internal or international, and thus ignored whether the accused was a 
state actor.256 Although neither of these tribunals took aim at the crime of 
aggression, they are important for demonstrating that historically, inter-
national criminal law has not discriminated based on state affiliation. 
Moving the focus to the 2010 amendment’s definition, while some 
might point to the U.N.’s definition of aggression257 as support for the 
state focused approach, this argument is unconvincing. To begin with, 
the U.N. definition passed into law in 1974,258 pre-dating the Rome Sta-
tute by twenty-four years. When the U.N. definition and the new defini-
tion are held side-by-side, they are nearly identical.259 In fact, Section 
two, Article eight of the SWG’s discussion paper cites directly to U.N. 
General Assembly Resolution 3314.260 Yet, it is worth noting that the 
assembled states that initially enacted the original Rome Statute did not 
utilize the U.N. definition. When the Rome Statute was being drafted, the 
Resolution 3314 definition was considered by some as a mere political 
guide, unsuitable for prosecution purposes.261 
Furthermore, Resolution 3314 was passed in an era when newly 
formed states were worried about the abuses of colonialism. 262 These 
nations were concerned with interference by the major world powers that 
took place during the Cold War.263 Since the passing of U.N. Resolution 
                                                                                                                                  
 254. See Zegveld, supra note 156, at 154. 
 255. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, ¶ 76. 
 256. See Zegveld, supra note 156, at 154–55. 
 257. This definition, adopted in 1974, defines aggression as “the use of armed force by 
a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set 
out in this Definition.” G.A. Res 3314 (XXIX), supra note 187, art. 1. 
 258. G.A. Res 3314 (XXIX), supra note 187. 
 259. Compare G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), with Rome Statute Amendments, supra note 
17, art 8(2). 
 260. “Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance 
with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, 
qualify as an act of aggression.” ICC Discussion Paper, supra note 182, art. 8 bis(2). 
 261. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: MAJOR UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE DRAFT STATUTE 13 (1996), availa-
ble at http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/2PrepCmtEstablishICCLCHR.pdf. 
 262. Specifically, the resolution was passed in 1974, during the Cold War. During this 
time, many states found themselves threatened by the pressures of Soviet and U.S. influ-
ence. See Murphy, supra note 196, at 5. 
 263. Id. 
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3314, the U.N. itself has been critical of the inadequacies of the laws go-
verning NSAs. In a General Assembly meeting of the U.N., it was admit-
ted that when they were founded in 1945, the major concern was to pre-
vent the outbreak of another World War.264 Now, however, the High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change has recognized that in 
the decades to come, the threats facing the world go beyond “states wag-
ing aggressive war,” and include dangers like internal wars, terrorism, 
and transnational criminal organizations. 265  Furthermore, these threats 
stem from both NSAs as well as states.266 When the U.N. has implicitly 
acknowledged the weaknesses of their definition of aggression, it is non-
sensical for the ASP to turn around and adopt identical language as its 
own. Rather than ensuring the norms governing NSAs in the conflict 
context remain up to par with states, the ASP chose to maintain an in-
adequate status quo. 
IV. IMPROPER DEFINITION: AN OPPORTUNITY MISSED 
By enacting the 2010 amendment to the Rome Statute, the internation-
al community has missed a critical opportunity to improve the laws po-
licing NSAs. In 1974, the U.N. proffered several reasons for why it was 
exigent to define aggression: 1) deterrence of aggression, 2) simplifying 
identification of the crime, 3) simplifying measures for suppressing ag-
gression, and 4) facilitating the protection of the rights and lawful inter-
ests of victims.267 The proliferation of NSAs and the threat they pose to 
collective security make these reasons just as, if not more, relevant today. 
Part A of this Section criticizes the ASP for embracing an outdated de-
finition of criminal aggression, virtually mimicking the one adopted by 
the U.N. in 1974, while completely ignoring the shifting dynamic of in-
ternational conflicts. This Section further points out that this is proble-
matic because opportunities to update international law do not come fre-
quently. Part B focuses on why the amendment’s definition is inferior to 
other potential definitions that better align themselves with the norms of 
international criminal law. Finally, Part C points out that excluding 
NSAs from this definition undermines both the goals of the U.N. and of 
criminalizing aggression. 
                                                                                                                                  
 264. At the initial creation of the U.N., the founding members considered collective 
security in the traditional sense. That is, aggression against one would provoke a unified 
response against the perpetrator. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, synopsis. 
 265. Id. (urging that “[t]he central challenge for the twenty-first century is to fashion a 
new and broader understanding . . . of what collective security means . . .”). 
 266. Id. 
 267. G.A. Res 3314 (XXIX), supra note 187. 
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A. As the World Turns . . . 
In a world where the boundaries of statehood continually evaporate, 
both in business and conflicts, the amendment’s definition seems to 
completely ignore international trends. Confining the crime of aggression 
to conflicts between states commits the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime 
to the same shortcomings that already plague international law. The fail-
ings of international humanitarian laws have often been pinpointed to 
their being highly state-centric, despite the evolving non-state order.268 
Furthermore, in 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense’s National De-
fense Strategy described an environment “defined by a global struggle 
against a violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the interna-
tional state system.”269 It makes little sense to focus the crime of aggres-
sion on states, when aggression seeking the explicit overthrow of state-
hood has become, at least from the U.S.’s purview, the world’s largest 
problem. 
Although the term NSA as used in this article admittedly encompasses 
a broader array of groups than those discussed by the U.S. Department of 
Defense,270 those groups that were discussed offer an appropriate exam-
ple. Much like the threats of Communism and Fascism which threatened 
the global order in the past, the violent extremists of today not only reject 
international law, but look to overthrow it. 271 These groups explicitly 
reject ideas like borders and state sovereignty. 272 Conversely, without 
principles like state sovereignty, the very notion of an international 
community that comes together to create law is undermined. 
This problem has existed for decades, and the only new development 
about conflicts between a state and a NSA is the frequency with which 
they occur. Napoleon’s campaigns in Spain during the 19th century, 
German forces that occupied the Balkans during World War II, the con-
flict between Britain and Ireland, and the ongoing fighting between Israel 
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories are all examples of such con-
                                                                                                                                  
 268. Marco Sassòli, Engaging Armed Nonstate Actors with International Humanita-
rian Law,  6 CANADIAN CONSORTIUM ON HUMAN SECURITY, no. 2, 2008, at 15, available 
at http://www.humansecurity.info/#/vol62-sassoli/4527407461. 
 269. U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY, supra note 122, at 2. 
 270. The Department of Defense report was largely concerned with reacting to the 
proliferation of terrorist organizations, citing the 9/11 attacks in its introduction, and dis-
cussing violent extremist ideology that is not necessarily applicable to all NSAs. Al-
though terrorist organizations fall within the purview of the term NSA, as the term is used 
in this Note it encompasses a broader range of groups. Id. 
 271. See id. 
 272. See id. 
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flicts.273 However, those are examples spread across hundreds of years. 
Today, one need only pick up a newspaper to see several such conflicts 
around the globe.274 Just nine days after the Bali Bombing275 on October 
12, 2002, fourteen people were killed in a suicide bombing in Israel.276 
Meanwhile, Mounir El Motassadeq, a suspected member of Al-Qaida 
operating in Hamburg, was standing trial in Germany as an accomplice 
to the 9/11 attacks.277 As the number of incidents involving NSAs in-
creases, so does the frequency with which the legal system must deal 
with them. Yet the2010 amendment’s definition neither attempts to pre-
dict future problems, nor does it react to emerging ones; instead, ASP 
chose to react to problems that faced the U.N. thirty-five years ago. 
Further recognition of the threat presented by NSAs can be gleaned 
from developments in the laws of war. According to the Yugoslavia tri-
bunal, the laws of armed conflict have shifted from protecting state sove-
reignty to protecting human rights.278 The African Union signed the Non-
Aggression Common Defense Pact, defining aggression as the use of 
armed force by a state, an organization of states, or non-state actors.279 
                                                                                                                                  
 273. Anthony Rogers, Asymmetric Warfare: Some Personal Reflections, 27 
COLLEGIUM (SPECIAL ISSUE) 15, 15 (2003). 
 274. Id. at 16. 
 275. The bombing took place at a bar in the town of Kuta, killing 202 people and injur-
ing 209. The group thought to be responsible was Jemaah Islamiyah, an Islamist group 
linked to Al-Qaida. Other Indonesian officials believe that Al-Qaida was directly respon-
sible. 2002 Bali Terrorist Bombings, KNOWLEDGERUSH,  
http://www.knowledgerush.com/kr/encyclopedia/2002_Bali_terrorist_bombing/ (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
 276. On October 21, 2002, fourteen people were killed as the result of a suicide bomb-
ing. The attack was carried out by an explosive-laden Jeep. Terrorism Against Israel in 
2002, KNOWLEDGERUSH, 
http://www.knowledgerush.com/kr/encyclopedia/Terrorism_against_Israel_in_2002/ (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
 277. Mounir El Motassadeq was initially charged on August 29, 2002, and was con-
victed for complicity in the 9/11 attacks on February 18, 2003. Profile: Mounir El Motas-
sadeq, HISTORY COMMONS, 
http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=mounir_el_motassadeq (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2011). 
 278. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 154, at 258. 
 279. African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, Afr. Union, Jan. 31, 
2005, 4th Ord. Sess. (not yet entered into force), available at http://www.africa-
un-
ion.org/root/AU/Documents/Treaties/text/Non%20Aggression%20Common%20Defence
%20Pact.pdf. The tragedies in Africa make it a marquee example of the implications of 
the crime of aggression, as there have been over nine million internally displaced people, 
and hundreds of thousands of deaths resulting from a variety of conflicts and civil wars. 
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Additionally, countries like France have restructured their armies to be 
better suited for asymmetric warfare,280 rather than traditional warfare 
where the assembled forces of two or more states confront each other.281 
Thus, as the landscape of war continues to change, it is important that the 
rules governing warfare do likewise. 
Discussions by the U.N. also support including NSAs under the defini-
tion of aggression. It is worth noting that since adopting Resolution 
3314, the U.N. Security Council has specifically condemned a NSA for 
committing the crime of aggression. Security Council Resolution 405 
condemned the mercenary group282 which attacked Benin on January 17, 
1977, for “the act of armed aggression.”283 This resolution makes no ref-
erence to a state sponsor.284 The International Law Commission viewed 
the coup in the Comoros Islands in a similar vein.285 The coup was con-
ducted by mercenaries not affiliated with any state, causing the commis-
sion to fear they would not be guilty of aggression under a state-centered 
definition.286 Additionally, the U.N. recognized that the norms governing 
the use of force by NSAs have not kept up with their state-centered equi-
valents.287 This report, compiled by the Chair of the High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change called on the U.N. to “achieve the same 
degree of normative strength concerning non-state use of force as it has 
concerning state use of force.”288 The ASP to the Rome Statute should 
build upon this emerging awareness rather than ignore it. 
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It was a mistake to allow an opportunity to address these issues pass 
because it is not often that the laws governing conflicts see meaningful 
change.289 Given the complexity of the issues involved and the countless 
interests represented,290 enacting an international treaty takes a long time. 
This is evident from the four year gap between the establishment and 
entering into force of the Rome Statute,291 as well as the seven year gap 
between the court’s creation and the first review.292 Furthermore, it was 
not until twenty-nine years after the passage of the U.N. Charter that a 
definition to aggression was added.293 Thirty years later, the norms go-
verning NSAs in a conflict context are still criticized by the U.N.294 As 
such, since the ASP to the Rome Statute adopted a definition of aggres-
sion without addressing NSAs, it may be years, if not decades, before 
another opportunity presents itself. As a result, the international commu-
nity is committed to dealing with NSAs who engage in unlawful force, 
without adequate dispute resolution mechanisms. 
B. Individuals? No. Criminal Organizations? No. 
The accepted definition of aggression represents a missed opportunity 
for the international community for two reasons. The definition restricts 
prosecution to individuals who “exercise control over or [] direct the po-
litical or military action of a state.”295 Thus, the ICC will have no juris-
diction over NSAs, regardless of their capacity, 296 and as such, will not 
be able to levy any sort of judgment against the organization with which 
a suspected criminal is involved. To fully appreciate the shortcomings of 
                                                                                                                                  
 289. The Geneva Conventions were adopted in 1949. Twenty-eight years passed be-
fore the two Additional Protocols were adopted. Since 1977, no new additions have been 
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 296. See id.  
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this definition, it is important to consider the implications of an alternate 
definition. 
In this regard, the accepted definition of aggression steps away from 
the foundations of international criminal law, rather than looking to them 
as a guideline. The Nuremberg IMT not only took aim at the crime of 
aggression, but defined it in a manner substantially different than the 
ASP.297 For starters, the statute took aim specifically at individuals and 
further explained that an individual’s position will not factor into the 
question of guilt.298 Moreover, although the statute was meant to prose-
cute war criminals in the aftermath of World War II,299 the statute actual-
ly took aim specifically at NSAs. Where the IMT found an individual 
was associated with an illegal group or organization, it empowered the 
IMT to declare that they were criminal organizations.300 This in turn al-
lowed the state harboring such organizations to treat any known affiliates 
as criminals and prosecute them accordingly.301 In such further prosecu-
tions, the criminal nature of the organization was not considered and the 
IMT’s decision was taken as final.302 
It is clear that this statute meant to take aim at individuals and the 
groups they were associated with, irrelevant of state affiliation. In a 
modern context, if a definition similar to the one utilized by the Nurem-
berg IMT replaced the 2010 amendment, it would vastly improve the 
ICC’s power over NSAs. Not only would the court be allowed to hear the 
cases of individuals brought before them, but a successful prosecution 
would trigger state jurisdiction over criminals that happen to be part of 
the same organization. Theoretically, if the Nuremberg IMT’s definition 
applied, the ICC could prosecute a member of Al-Qaida who was in-
volved in the 9/11 attack, irrelevant of his status as a policy-maker. Fur-
thermore, if the prosecution was successful, it would trigger criminal 
status in every nation that Al-Qaida is located. Given that Al-Qaida has 
known affiliations in the Philippines, Eritrea, Algeria, Afghanistan, 
Chechnya, Tajikistan, Kashmir, Somalia, and Yemen, this would be a 
                                                                                                                                  
 297. Nuremberg IMT, supra note 72, art. 6(a); cf  ICC Discussion Paper, supra note 
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major accomplishment.303 In addition to being responsible to the ICC, 
national courts in those nations would have jurisdiction over Al-Qaida 
members, and the question of the group’s criminal nature would be pre-
decided. Conversely, under the new definition, if the ICC managed to get 
a hold of the person directly responsible for the 9/11 attacks, they would 
not be able to prosecute him, let alone his underlings or foreign asso-
ciates. 
C. Undermining its Own Goals 
It is important to remember that changes to the Rome Statute not only 
affect the ICC, but also have implications for the U.N. Both the U.N. and 
the ICC have recognized the goal of reaching a “mutually beneficial rela-
tionship,” formalized in an agreement between both parties. 304  The 
agreement dictated that the two entities should cooperate closely in fur-
therance of performing their respective responsibilities.305 This relation-
ship is evidenced by the Security Council’s right to refer cases to the 
ICC306 and the U.N.’s obligation to provide the ICC with documents re-
levant to a given case.307 Implicit to such a symbiotic relationship is that 
fulfillment of the goals of one party benefits the other. While updating 
the norms that govern the use of force by NSAs is a U.N. interest,308 it is 
a goal that the ASP to the Rome Statute had an opportunity to accom-
plish. Furthermore, the effects of this relationship have already been rec-
ognized. The report from the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change points out that early indications showed that the Security 
Council’s willingness to use its power under the Rome Statute might de-
ter parties from violating laws of war. 309  The report argued that the 
U.N.’s role in preventing wars would be improved by developing the 
legal regimes and dispute resolution mechanisms.310 Because of this, the 
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Rome Statute is one of the most important recent developments in terms 
of legal mechanisms.311 
With the ramifications on the U.N. and global community in mind, a 
definition of aggression that excludes NSAs undermines the purpose of 
criminalizing the act. This is particularly troubling because states and 
NSAs are equally capable of the threats a definition of aggression seeks 
to avert. Surely, where the goals of the U.N. were to deter, identify, and 
suppress aggression,312 the source of the aggression should be irrelevant. 
A NSA that has the capabilities of using force on the global scale can just 
as easily threaten peace and national security as a state entity.313 
Even in purely internal conflicts, aggression by NSAs can undermine a 
state government, with the resultant instability creating a threat to inter-
national peace and security.314 An armed attack carried out by a NSA is 
still an armed attack, and the threat presented to a nation’s security is in 
no way lessened because it stems from an entity not recognized by inter-
national law.315 For example, in 1974, under Resolution 3314, the U.N. 
highlighted the existence of weapons of mass destruction as a reason for 
why defining aggression was so important.316 Incidentally, a report to the 
U.N. General Assembly thirty years later highlighted that amongst the 
challenges facing collective security was the possibility of NSAs obtain-
ing nuclear or biological weapons.317 Given the gravity of the crime of 
aggression, ignoring NSAs’ very real capabilities of carrying out crimi-
nal aggression is simply inconsistent with the goals of the U.N. and the 
ASP to the Rome Statute. 
Similarly, if by defining aggression the goal is to protect victims’ 
rights and access to remedies,318 the state-centered approach is again, 
counterintuitive. The 1974 resolution reaffirmed a duty that states not use 
armed force to deprive people of their rights and freedoms or disrupt the 
territorial integrity of a victim state. 319 Yet, the High-Level Panel on 
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Threats, Challenges, and Change reports that the ideals behind terrorism 
are an attack on the U.N.’s respect for human rights.320 Additionally, the 
report cites the rise of civil wars as the predominant form of warfare as 
evidence that new states321 face crises of capacity and legitimacy.322 Re-
cognizing these facts evidences that NSAs are capable of causing the 
very problem a definition of aggression hopes to avert. Thus, given the 
victim oriented nature of this goal, it is irrational to think the victim 
would be concerned with whether the person violating his rights had 
state association. It is hard to rectify affording a villager in some Bosnian 
valley certain protections from having his rights violated by a foreign 
aggressor, but denying them to civilians living in a valley plagued by 
internal conflict.323 
Considering that NSAs fall outside the scope of the U.N. Charter,324 it 
is even more imperative to hold them criminally responsible under inter-
national law. As discussed above, the idea of international criminal law 
is to punish crimes that pierce state value-neutrality.325 It logically fol-
lows that if the U.N.’s purpose is to maintain peace and promote national 
security, then groups bent on undermining those principles should be the 
focus, not the exception.326 Yet, for example, Al-Qaida is considered the 
first instance of a sophisticated terrorist network, 327  and has publicly 
stated that the U.N. is one of its enemies and stands as an obstacle to its 
goals.328 Such declarations are not hollow rhetoric as Al-Qaida was re-
sponsible for attacks against ten members of the U.N. across four conti-
nents between 1999 and 2004.329 Ignoring such groups is an acquies-
cence of a threat to international stability, something that the U.N. hopes 
to avoid,330 and is an interest of the ASP to the Rome Statute in defining 
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aggression. 331 Given the “piercing state value-neutrality” principle for 
defining an activity as an international crime, if the ASP to the Rome 
Statute finds that endangering one of the founding principles of the U.N. 
does not constitute such a crime, it is difficult to imagine what does. 
In updating the laws governing the use of force, the goal should be 
creating parity between states and NSAs.332 Instead, holding NSAs out-
side the scope of criminal aggression presents a problem of symmetry. 
There is no question that once a state has been attacked by a NSA such 
as a terrorist, that state will be bound by the U.N. Charter.333 Specifical-
ly, Article 51 of the Charter allows the use of force in self-defense if an 
armed attack occurs.334 Since a state could target a NSA under this article 
as it does not limit the targets of lawful self-defense,335 this would mean 
one party to the conflict has to conduct hostilities within the scope of a 
set of laws, while the other does not. This double standard does not make 
sense; the U.N. should work towards establishing normative rules con-
cerning the use of force by NSAs that match state equivalents.336 Just as 
there is no question that the U.S. was bound by Article 51 of the Charter 
following 9/11,337 it is agreed that the attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda 
were of severe enough quality to constitute an armed attack, triggering 
retaliation under Article 51.338 The new definition formally recognizes 
that in the ensuing conflict between the U.S. and Al-Qaida, one party 
was bound by all relevant laws of the U.N. Charter, whereas the other 
remains an anomaly in international jurisprudence. 
CONCLUSION 
Regulating criminal activity and ensuring collective security is one of 
the chief goals of the international community. Yet, it is a problem that 
grows more complex with the proliferation of NSAs and is compounded 
by the fact that laws governing these groups are an anachronism of inter-
national law. Branches of law such as international humanitarian and 
human rights law are a holdover from a time when the most pressing 
concern of the international community was the outbreak of another 
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world war and, as such, focus entirely on the state.339 The U.N. itself was 
created under the daunting shadow of World War II and was essentially a 
direct response to the catastrophic event.340 Thus, it is not surprising that 
many of the principles formalized by its charter completely ignore the 
threats created by NSAs. 
Going forward, it is important to recognize the weaknesses of the 
present legal framework so that future laws do not succumb to the same 
problems. Of the three principle branches of international law associated 
with armed conflicts, two arguably do not apply to NSAs. International 
human rights law is recognized as only incurring state responsibility341 
and NSAs can properly contest international humanitarian law as inap-
plicable because they had no part in its enactment.342 International crimi-
nal law alone has managed to pierce state borders by targeting individu-
als rather than abstract, collective entities.343 
Given an international climate where some of the most pressing dan-
gers stem from terrorism and transnational criminal organizations, it is 
important to preserve international criminal law’s role in prosecuting 
NSAs. In the realm of international criminal law, there is no more impor-
tant establishment than the ICC. The ICC is the first and only permanent 
international court that is the functional equivalent of the transient IMTs 
of the past.344 The Rome Statute, which empowers and confers jurisdic-
tion to the ICC, explicitly targets NSAs as capable of committing three 
of the four recognized crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide.345 The fourth crime, aggression, was undefined until 2010. 
The definition of aggression agreed on by the ASP to the Rome Statute 
is nonsensical on numerous levels, the most basic of which is that it con-
tradicts the principles of international criminal law. Starting with the 
IMTs following World War II through those established to prosecute the 
atrocities in Yugoslavia, international criminal law has focused on the 
individual, irrelevant of state association. The amendment definition 
makes aggression the lone crime for which the ICC cannot prosecute 
NSAs. 
Moreover, in adopting a criminal definition of aggression, the ASP to 
the Rome Statute apparently ignored the problems afflicting the present 
and future in favor of combatting the issues of the past. The goals of de-
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fining aggression are to police the unlawful use of armed force, preserve 
collective security, and provide relief for victims of unlawful aggres-
sion.346 Yet when considering these reasons, it is patently clear that a 
NSA is just as much a threat as a state actor. The growth of organizations 
such as Al-Qaida clearly demonstrates that in the modern era, NSAs are 
capable of disrupting international security in the same manner as states. 
Furthermore, it is clear that any victim-based reasons should see no dis-
tinction in state-affiliation. If a group of villagers lose their home or 
loved ones as a result of the unlawful use of force, the legal affiliation of 
those who caused their loss is likely a distant afterthought. 
Thus, when the ASP to the Rome Statute gathered in 2010 it had a 
unique opportunity to update international law. A proper definition of 
aggression would have improved the legal mechanisms for policing 
NSAs for their international crimes. It could also have helped eliminate 
the disparities between the laws of armed conflict as they apply to states 
and NSAs. Instead, these opportunities were missed and there is no tell-
ing when there will be another such chance. 
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